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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPE AI S 
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IM.niilill/Appcllcc, 
vs. 
DEAN ALAN SHEPHARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
( .tsi- -•>.: ^ ( • 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
•i. Has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
U a h C -KI- " ' . • -. : ""s-j-:>(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support Shephard's conviction for 
o;vrar . -. , ,, . .: . , conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient when, after viewing ••: i« • • \ . - v • M - u ?..i • i iher elr oni in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence ij . .. r 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable 
d--!«'•; • ... ? lid, . - :h( committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" 
State v. Holgate, 2000 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Because this issue was not preserved below, it is reviewed 
for plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111, 10 P.3d 346. Alternatively, this 
issue should be reviewed to determine whether defense counsel's failure to move for a 
directed verdict constituted ineffective assistance of counsel? When a claim of 
ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of 
law. State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994)). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory provisions is set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Dean Alan Shephard appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of 
the Third Judicial District Court after being convicted of possession or operation of a 
clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony, possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, and possession of 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Dean Alan Shephard was charged by information filed in Third District Court on 
December 13, 200 L, with: Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment, a first 
degree felony; Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a first 
degree felony; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and False 
Identity to a Peace Officer, a class C misdemeanor (R. 1, 5-8, 9-12). The information 
also indicated that the clandestine laboratory charge was subject to enhanced penalty 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-5(l)(d), (e) and/or (f) (R. 5). 
On January 10, 2002, Shephard waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the 
matter was bound over for trial (R. 22-23). 
On April 11, 2002, Shephard filed a motion to suppress evidence on grounds that 
it was obtained pursuant to a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 42-
46). A suppression hearing was held on July 29, 2002, before Judge Steven Roth, 
where the State alleged that because of a protective order against Shephard in 
relationship to Micalyn Yocham, Shephard lacked standing to challenge the seizure of 
any evidence pursuant to State v. Webb (R. 310: 4-5, 11). The State presented a copy 
of the protective order at the hearing (R. 181-85) but no return of service. The State 
also argued that there was a criminal "no contact" order in place from October 24, 
2001, in case number 011910084 (R. 168, 310: 7-8). The trial court agreed with the 
State and ruled that Shephard lacked standing (R. 310: 11-12). However, Judge 
Roth's ruling was conditioned upon the court subsequently receiving a certified copy of 
the return of service of the protective order (R. 310: 9-10, 12). 
On September 6, 2002, written findings of fact and conclusions of law denying 
the motion to suppress were filed and signed by Judge Sheila McCleve on September 
30, 2002 (R. 99-100, 111). Specifically the trial court found: One, that a protective 
order was entered on October 22, 2001, which ordered that Shephard be removed and 
excluded from the residence at 636 East Sego Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 99). 
Two, that on November 7, 2001, the protective order was served on Shephard as 
shown by the Return of Service (R. 99). Three, that evidence in this case was seized 
from the residence at 636 East Sego Avenue where Shephard was present (R. 100). 
And four, that the protective order was still in effect at the time the evidence was seized 
on December 4, 2001 (R. 100). The trial court concluded as follows: One, Shephard 
had no legal right to be present on the property from which the evidence was seized by 
court order. Two, Shephard had no privacy interests in the residence where the 
evidence was seized. Three, Shephard accordingly has no standing to contest the 
search of the residence (R. 100). 
A copy of the protective order and return of service was attached to the findings 
(R. 105-10). However, the certified copy of the protective order indicates that 
Shephard was not present at the October 22, 2001, hearing where the protective order 
was placed in effect (R. 105). In addition, the certified copy of the return of service 
only indicates that the protective order was served by leaving a copy of the order with 
Deputy R. Ramos at 3415 South 900 West (R. 110). 
On August 14, 2002, Shephard filed a motion to exclude fingerprint testimony 
unless the State could prove its inherent reliability at a pre-trial hearing pursuant to 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 (Utah 1989) (R. 64-65, 73-79). On August 15, 
2002, the State filed a notice of expert witness which named Karen Kido, a certified 
latent fingerprint examiner with the Salt Lake Police Department crime lab (R. 82). 
On August 23, 2002, Ralph Dellapiana and the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on grounds of a conflict of interest 
(R. 91). The motion was granted and Manny Garcia and Kevin Kurumada were 
appointed to represent Shephard at trial (R. 95). On September 6, 2002, Manny Garcia 
entered his appearance as counsel for Shephard (R. 97). 
On September 16, 2002, the trial court signed an order requiring the jail to 
monitor all of Shephard's correspondence to insure compliance with the no contact 
order between Shephard and the co-defendants, Micalyn Yocham and Todd Turner (R. 
103). 
On September 30, 2002, Judge McCleve orally denied Shephard's motion to 
exclude fingerprint testimony on reliability grounds (R. 313: 8). At this hearing, 
defense counsel (Garcia) raised the issue of whether the protective order had personally 
been served on Shephard when it was left with a jailer but then not given to Shephard 
(R. 313: 2-3). Judge McCleve indicated that Judge Roth had already heard and decided 
the motion to suppress'(R. 313: 3-4). Garcia then indicated his belief-based upon 
discussions with previous defense counsel-t hat the matter had not yet been "resolved" 
because there was still a question whether the State had offered proof that Shephard had 
been personally served with a copy of the protective order (R. 313: 4). Judge McCleve 
then stated that because factual findings and legal conclusions were ordered that "Judge 
Ro[th] thought [the issue] was resolved" (R. 4). Garcia then indicates that he is simply 
reserving the issue for appeal (R. 310: 4). However, then Garcia seems to retreat 
from this issue by indicating that although Shephard never received the protective 
order, "we're not going to pursue this motion to suppress" (R. 310: 5). 
On October 9, 2002, Garcia filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on grounds 
that "Defendant has stated to counsel that he has no faith in counsel's ability to 
adequately represent him, which has created an unreconcilable conflict" (R. 116). On 
October 11, 2002, Judge McCleve, after a hearing, signed an order granting the 
withdrawal (R. 118, 314). Fred Metos was subsequently appointed as counsel for 
Shephard (R. 130). 
On January 14-15, 2003, a jury trial was held with Judge McCleve presiding (R. 
195-97, 317, 318). After deliberation the jury convicted Shephard on counts I-III 
(clandestine lab with three enhancements, possession of methamphetamine with intent 
to distribute in a drug-free zone, and possession of drug paraphernalia) (R. 251-53). 
The jury acquitted Shephard of providing a false identity to a peace officer (R. 254). 
On March 3, 2003, Shephard was sentenced to consecutive 5-life terms in the 
Utah State Prison and ordered to pay $5,190.46 in restitution (R. 276-77). 
On March 17, 2003, Shephard filed a notice of appeal in Third District Court 
(R. 281). On April 25, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the matter to this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (R. 288). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Officer Mark R. Cryder 
Mark Cryder, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department, was 
dispatched on report from a neighbor to investigate a purported burglary in progress at 
636 East Sego Avenue on December 3, 2001, at approximately 6:30 p.m. (R. 317: 62-
63, 64, 69). Other officers also contemporaneously responded to the scene, including 
Officer Spangenberg (R. 317: 63). In addition, after Cryder's arrival at the scene, 
Sergeant Findlay was also called to the house (R. 317: 64). 
Spangenberg was the first officer to the scene and he discovered an individual 
(Turner) coming out of the garage (R. 317: 64, 65, 69). Spangenberg detained and 
questioned this individual (R. 317: 64). 
Spangenberg and Officer West, who arrived with Cryder, conducted a protective 
sweep of the garage to make sure that no one else was in the small, one-car garage (R. 
317: 65, 71). The officers subsequently informed Cryder of items they had found in 
the garage (R. 317: 65). 
Turner was placed under arrest (R. 317: 72). Cryder and Findlay subsequently 
entered the home adjacent to the garage due to "safety reasons" and to "make sure 
there was no other maybe victims or possible suspects that might be inside the home" 
(R. 317: 66). Cryder and Findlay knocked on a side door a couple of times before 
Shephard opened the door (R. 317: 66). Findlay was given a name by Shephard and 
was told that he did not own the home (R. 317: 66). Shephard was then taken out of 
the doorway and was "handed off to Spangenberg, who continued to speak with 
Shepard (R. 317: 66-67). Spangenberg subsequently learned Shephard's real name and 
was told that Shephard had been "inside the living room sleeping on the couch" (R. 
317: 67). 
Cryder and Findlay entered the home and found no other individuals present (R. 
317: 67). During this "protective sweep" of the house, Cryder observed a scale on a 
table in a corner of the living room; and on top of the scale was a crystalline-type 
substance that was consistent with methamphetamine (R. 317: 68, 74). In addition, 
Cryder found some plastic baggies and glassware and other paraphernalia throughout 
the house (R. 317: 68,76). 
B. Testimony of Officer Joseph Sturzenegger, III 
Joseph Sturzenegger, a narcotics detective with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, was notified that patrol officers had found a possible methamphetamine lab 
at the above-referenced address on December 3, 2001 (R. 317: 78-79). Sturzenegger 
and the rest of his unit responded to the scene (R. 317: 79). At the time Sturzenegger 
arrived, Turner and Shephard were in custody and the side door to the garage was open 
(R. 317: 92). 
Sturzenegger spoke with "a couple of people that were detained" and then 
"looked inside the garage" (R. 317: 79). Inside the garage, Sturzenegger found items 
consistent with the clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 317: 79). It 
appeared to Sturzenegger that the lab was "up and running in some sort of process" in 
the southwest corner (R. 317: 80, 93, 94). Although Sturzenegger could not smell any 
odor associated with chemicals, Haz-mat and the fire department were contacted to 
come and test the air (R. 317: 80, 93). The other officers then remained at the scene 
while Sturzenegger obtained a search warrant (R. 317: 80). 
Sturzenegger returned to the scene after obtaining the warrant (R. 317: 80). 
Sturzenegger then searched the inside of the house and found "lots of paraphernalia, 
some methamphetamine, some residency items, some photographs, some lab hardware, 
some lab chemicals" and a controlled substance on top of a digital scale on a table (R. 
317: 81-82). Sturzenegger testified that such scales are commonly used in drug 
distribution (R. 317: 98-99). Sturzenegger also found two plastic, zip-lock baggies next 
to the scale (R. 317: 83, 95). A methamphetamine recipe was also located on the table 
along with some glassware/dishes containing residue that field tested positive for 
methamphetamine (R. 317: 87, 88; Defense Exhibit #1). A large, 1,000 milliliter glass 
flask tube was found in the kitchen cupboard (R. 317: 88). Sturzenegger testified that 
such a flat-bottom flask is often found in a lot of meth labs because "they stand up to 
heat" (R. 317: 89). Other chemicals that are associated with the production of 
methamphetamine-in eluding a BernzOmatic gas canister and a can of acetone-were 
also found underneath the kitchen sink (R. 317: 90). In addition, several pipes were 
found in the house (R. 317: 98). 
These items were "processed", i.e., photographed, tested for latent fingerprints 
(R. 317: 84). The substance on the scale was tested by the State Crime Lab and was 
deemed to be 3.4 grams (an eighth of an ounce) of methamphetamine (R. 317: 85, 86, 
110; State's Exhibit #4). Sturzenegger testified that this amount is more than an 
individual would typically use in a day unless it was used with friends (R. 317: 109, 
11041). 
Sturzenegger testified that the amount of methamphetamine coupled with the 
scale and the baggies is "indicative of drug distribution" (R. 317: 86-87). Sturzenegger 
also indicated that meth labs are typically not run in the open but behind closed doors; 
and that "most good cooks leave their cook unattended while it is cooking" (R. 317: 
104-05). This "separates them from the lab" which "keeps them from blowing 
themselves up" and "keeps them from discovery by law enforcement" (R. 317: 105). 
C. Testimony of Officer Brad Davis 
Brad Davis, who is assigned to the narcotics unit of the Salt Lake City Police 
department, took a laser reading or measurement between 636 East Sego Avenue to 
nrolley Square (R. 317: 112). A laser is used to measure speed or distance (R. 317: 
113). Davis testified that the distance between the home and the Trolley Square mall 
was 554.4 feet (R. 317: 113-14). 
D. Testimony of Bonnie Jill Stewart 
Bonnie Jill Stewart is a crime lab technician with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department (R. 317: 114-15). Stewart responded to the Sego Avenue residence to 
photograph the scene and to process some items of evidence (R. 317: 115). At the 
scene, she processed several items and took "six lift cards of fingerprints" (R. 317: 
115). Stewart lifted six prints off the scale and one print off the glass weighing plate of 
the scale (R. 317: 115-16). Stewart also processed several glassware items, a pyrex 
container, and possibly a beaker (R. 317: 119). Another technician (Weaver) processed 
additional items in the house (R. 317: 119). Generally it is impossible to tell how 
long a print has been on an item (R. 317: 121). 
E. Testimony of Daniel James Weaver 
Daniel Weaver is also a crime lab technician with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department (R. 317: 123). Weaver was also present at the Sego Avenue residence to 
take photographs of the inside of the house and to process some of that evidence for 
fingerprints (R. 317: 123). Weaver took four lifts "that were of comparable value off 
of a couple of glass beakers (the 1,000 milliliter beaker and a 125-milliliter beaker (R. 
317: 124, 125). 
F. Testimony of Karen Kido 
Karen Kido, another Salt Lake City crime lab technician, examined the 
fingerprints that were taken from the evidence at the scene (R. 317: 128). Kido 
testified that the prints depicted on State's Exhibit #8 (lifted by Stewart), #9 (lifted by 
Stewart), and #10 (lifted by Weaver) matched up to Shephard (R. 317: 131, 132, 133, 
136-37). Kido analyzed ten latent lift cards total including two other fingerprints that 
she matched up to Micalyn Yocham (one lifted by Stewart and one by Weaver) (R. 
317: 135). Kido testified that none of the fingerprints matched up to Turner (R. 317: 
137-38). 
G. Testimony of Kyle Boelter 
Kyle Boelter is an undercover narcotic detective with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department (R. 317: 139). Boelter responded to the scene with Sturzenegger at the 
request of patrol officers (R. 317: 139). Upon arrival at the scene he talked with the 
patrol officers and then chatted with Turner and Shephard (R. 317: 139). Boelter also 
initially looked at items found in the garage (R. 317: 139). 
Boelter interviewed Shephard at the scene and informed him of his rights per 
Miranda (R. 317: 140). Shephard stated that he had been at the residence earlier in the 
day and that on occasion he stays at the residence (R. 317: 140). Shephard told Boelter 
that the residence belonged to his girlfriend, Micalyn (R. 317: 141). Shephard 
indicated that he had used methamphetamine once or twice when he was eighteen years-
old (R. 317: 141). Shephard told Boelter that he rode his bicycle there that day and he 
brought a couple of bags to the residence (R. 317: 141, 163). Shephard gave consent 
to search the bags and no illegal items or any materials used to manufacture 
methamphetamine were found in the bags (R. 317: 141-42, 162). The bags contained 
"a numerous amount of clothing" (R. 317: 165). Shepard informed Boelter that he 
"knew nothing" about the contents in the garage or what was taking place (R. 317: 
165). 
Boelter testified that there are common characteristics among people who 
regularly use methamphetamine (R. 318: 191). These include a low appetite, grayish 
or pasty skin tone, a nervous or "jumpy" character, and accelerated speech (R. 318: 
192). Many users also scratch their skin often, causing open sores on their face and 
their arms (R. 318: 192). Boelter testified that officers can give people field sobriety 
and laboratory tests to determine whether a person is using drugs such as 
methamphetamine (R. 318: 193). Shephard was not subjected to any of these tests (R. 
318: 193). 
Boelter also assisted in the execution of the search warrant and participated in 
the "processing of the lab, of the components that were located inside the garage" (R. 
317: 142). Processing the lab means to take the components from where they are in the 
garage-or the hot zon e-and to break each it em down, itemize it on a list, photograph 
it, take necessary samples, and then place them off to the side so a waste hazard 
company could remove the items (R. 317: 145). Boelter testified that a lab is set 
up/processed with three different zones: A hot zone or where the actual lab is at for 
contamination purposes; A warm zone or the area of processing; And a cold zone 
wilich is where the command post or other officers are located (R. 317: 145-46). 
Boelter testified that the garage was equipped with an "early warning device of 
some sort" that contained a loud alarm (R. 317: 143). And that from the garage 
doorway you could see "the vent tube that was running along the length of the rafters. 
Right off the right-hand side there was a small, red bag with some tubing inside of it. 
Right off, to the right side of the doorway is where you can see the bucket that was 
containing the water. And then a couple other large, Rubbermaid boxes" (R. 317: 143-
44). None of the lab items Boelter described were found outside the garage (R. 317: 
144). 
Boelter testified that the lab appeared to be in the "distillation process"; and that 
it was running when he found it (R. 317: 144). The lab was within 500 feet of the 
garage and other residences (R. 317: 145). Items that were processed from the lab by 
Boelter included: a volumetric cylinder with iodine crystals on the bottom (State's 
Exhibit #15); three 16-ounce containers of Red Devil lye (State's Exhibit #16); five 
different containers of lacquer thinner, paint thinner, and acetone (State's Exhibit #17); 
numerous components of other scientific glassware (with staining on them) and funnels 
(State's Exhibit #18); and a 1,000-milliliter reaction vessel (State's Exhibit #19) (R. 
317: 149-52). Boelter testified that all of these items are commonly used in the 
production of methamphetamine (R. 317: 149-52). In addition, Boelter found the 
reaction vessel, a 4,000-milliliter flat-bottom flask, along with a separatory funnel 
(State's Exhibits #20-22) "actually hooked up and in the actual process of 
manufacturing meth at the time" (R. 317: 152-53). Boelter also found two condenser 
columns (State's Exhibit # 23), one of which was hooked up to the other components 
and an Ohaus scale, commonly used in drug trafficking (R. 317: 153-54, 167). 
A backpack was also found in the garage (State's Exhibit #12) which contained 
various items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 318: 184-
85). Among the items found were glassware, iodine, liquid methamphetamine, 
hydrochloric acid, a digital scale, and other paraphernalia (R. 318: 185-87). 
Samples from the lab were sent to the State Crime Lab for analysis (R. 317: 147; 
State's Exhibit #4). After the lab was processed, the hazardous wastes were disposed 
(R. 317: 157). 
Boelter testified that they attempted to take fingerprints from the lab items, but 
they were unsuccessful because of the cold, snowing weather (R. 317: 156). 
Boelter testified that the entire cooking process takes between four and ten hours, 
depending on "numerous factors" (R. 317: 158). During the initial four to six hours, 
the cook does not need to be present (R. 317: 158). The cook also does not need to be 
present during the final distillation process, which can take from two to four hours (R. 
317: 158). 
Boelter testified that he went inside the house and looked around and saw some 
paraphernalia, however he did not complete a search of the house (R. 317: 159). 
H. Testimony of Jeff Payne 
Jeff Payne is a detective for the Salt Lake City Police department, specializing in 
the investigation and clean up of methamphetamine labs (R. 317: 169). Payne testified 
that pursuant to section 58-37d-6, intent to manufacture methamphetamine is inferred if 
a person possesses "one of three precursor chemicals, which three are red phosphorous, 
pseudoephedrine and iodine, in conjunction with one of five items, the hardware, which 
the items are a reaction vessel, a separatory funnel, a glass condenser, a heat mantle, 
some type of heat source, or analytical balance or scales" (R. 317: 170). 
Payne explained that there are "two halves to the manufacturing of 
methamphetamine" (R. 317: 171). The first part involves the "cooking/manufacturing 
phase" where the precursor chemicals are mixed, turning pseudoephedrine into a 
methamphetamine acid (R. 317: 171-72). A base, such as Red Devil Lye, is added 
creating a methamphetamine base (R. 317: 172-73). The meth base is then placed in a 
reaction vessel, using rubber tubing attached to a condenser column (R. 317: 174). The 
water and methamphetamine is evaporated and distilled together, creating 
methamphetamine (R. 317: 174). Payne testified that "in this case everything is present 
... for the manufacturing process" of methamphetamine (R. 317: 171). 
Payne also testified that this lab cannot be left along for very long while 
methamphetamine is being manufactured (R. 317: 174). Payne testified that the whole 
process took four hours, but "depending on each individual recipe, your time frames 
will change" (R. 317: 175). Through each stage, a person has to be physically present 
to mix the chemicals, adjust the pH, dry the product out, and distill it (R. 317: 175-77). 
I. Testimony of Micalyn Yocham 
Micalyn Yocham testified that at the time of trial she had known Shephard for 5-
6 years; and that after a period of no contact, she became reacquainted with him 
approximately 2 years earlier (R. 318: 194). Yocham testified that on December 3, 
2001, she was residing at 636 East Sego Avenue (R. 318: 194). Shephard stayed with 
Yocham "off and on" but a "majority of the time" during 2001 (R. 318: 194-95). 
Yocham did not see Shephard at the house on December 3, 2001, however, she did see 
him during the evening of December 2 for about 20 minutes (R. 318: 195-96). 
Yocham left for work at 8:00 a.m. on December 3 and did not return home until 
after 6:00 p.m. (R. 318: 196-97). Yocham discovered around midnight that the police 
had been to her house by checking her work voice mail while at a friends house (R. 
318: 197, 221). 
Yocham testified that some items in her house were not the in the same order as 
she left them (R. 318: 200, 203). Yocham thought her house was not as messy when 
the police found it, and she also could not remember leaving a chair on the table or 
having a power cord running from her home to her shed outside (R. 318: 203-04). 
Yocham thought she left a digital scale (State's Exhibit #3) in a hall closet, not on the 
kitchen table (R. 318: 198). Yocham admitted that her fingerprints would be on the 
scale, but she did not remember leaving the baggies of methamphetamine with the scale 
on the kitchen table (R. 318: 198-99). Yocham did not recognize the 1000 milliliter 
beaker (State's Exhibit #6) found in her pantry (R. 318: 199). However, Yocham 
admitted that the small beaker (Defense's Exhibit #2) was hers and that she used it for 
"rocks" (R. 318: 200). 
Yocham testified that the bicycle (State's Exhibit #12) belonged to Shephard (R. 
318: 201). The red jacket in the garage "look[ed] like" one Shephard owned and 
Yocham also thought that the backpack in the garage was Shephard's (R. 318: 202). 
Yocham admitted to using methamphetamine the week prior to December 3, but 
denied any knowledge regarding the operating clandestine lab in her own garage (R. 
318: 203, 216). Yocham had not been in the garage for two or three months before the 
police came, and admitted that she did not know when or how the jacket got there (R. 
318: 214). 
Yocham also admitted to using and being addicted to methamphetamine for a 
year prior to December 3 (R. 318: 218-20). Yocham did not think that 
methamphetamine was in her house on December 3, but admitted that she had 
paraphernalia for smoking methamphetamine in her home (R. 318: 197, 203, 216). 
Yocham also flatly denied that the methamphetamine found in her home on December 3 
was hers (R. 318: 222). However, Yocham previously entered a plea agreement where 
she admitted to knowingly possessing the methamphetamine found in her home on 
December 3 (R. 318: 223-28). 
Yocham denied using the digital scale for weighing drugs, and testified "I never 
used it" for anything (R. 318: 215). She thought a friend left the scale at her home (R. 
318: 215). 
Yocham was originally charged with three first degree felonies, but entered a 
plea to a third degree felony, possession of methamphetamine, and was sentenced to 
two years probation and community service (R. 318: 202, 205, 233). The plea was 
conditioned upon Yocham testifying against Shephard at trial (R. 318: 209-10). 
J. Testimony of Todd Turner 
Todd Turner has known Shephard for "over ten years" (R. 318: 246). Turner 
went over to Yocham's house on December 2, 2001, because he had heard that 
Shephard "was staying there with his girlfriend" (R. 318: 247). Turner saw Shephard 
and Yocham "for a few minutes" that evening (R. 318: 247). 
Turner again went to Yocham's the next day on the 3rd, supposedly to "get 
high" with Shephard (R. 318: 247, 249). Around 6:30 p.m., Turner pulled into 
Yocham's driveway and then knocked on the door (R. 318: 247). After no one 
answered, Turner went to the garage door "and pushed it open" to see if there any tools 
in there (R. 318: 248). Turner testified "I dropped my muffler off my truck ... like 
right before that" and went in the garage to see if there were any tools (R. 318: 248). 
Once Turner was in the garage, he heard a car pull up and heard someone yell 
"in the garage" (R. 318: 248). Turner went outside and saw police surround the house 
and then he was arrested (R. 318: 248-49). 
Turner did not see Shephard that night, nor did he enter Yocham's house (R. 
318: 250-51). Turner also did not know whether Shephard had a bicycle, but he knew 
that Yocham had a car (R. 318: 251). 
Turner claimed that the backpack in the garage was not his, but he admitted to 
having methamphetamine in his pocket (R. 318: 252-53). Turner also admitted to using 
drugs earlier that day with intent to get more at Yocham's house (R. 318: 256). 
Turner was originally charged with a first degree felony for operating a 
clandestine laboratory, but based on his agreement to testify against Shephard, his 
charge was reduced to a third degree felony for possession of methamphetamine (R. 
318: 255-56). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Dean 
Shephard intentionally engaged in operating a clandestine laboratory. The State failed 
to show sufficient evidence that Shephard possessed a controlled substance precursor or 
laboratory equipment with the requisite intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation. Thus, the State failed to prove a sufficient nexus between Shephard and the 
clandestine laboratory. 
Additionally, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that Shephard possessed a 
controlled substance precursor or laboratory equipment with intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory and the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the 
trial court committed plain error in submitting this charge to the jury. 
But for this error, Shephard would have received a more favorable outcome at 
trial. Accordingly, Shephard asks this Court to reverse his conviction for operating a 
clandestine laboratory. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
SHEPHARD'S CONVICTION FOR OPERATION OF A 
CLANDESTINE LABORATORY BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED 
TO ESTABLISH A SUFFICIENT NEXUS BETWEEN SHEPHARD 
AND THE CLANDESTINE LABORATORY 
Shephard asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knowingly 
and intentionally operated a clandestine laboratory in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 58-37d-5, because the State failed to prove a sufficient nexus between Shephard and 
the clandestine laboratory. Shephard also asserts that it was plain error for the trial 
court to submit this case to the jury, or in the alternative, his trial counsel's 
performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move for a 
directed verdict regarding the clandestine laboratory charge. Accordingly, Shephard 
asks this Court to reverse his conviction for operating a clandestine laboratory. 
An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can 
demonstrate that... 'p lain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 
P.3d 346 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. 
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)). 
To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a defendant 
must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged...." Holgate, 2000 UT 71 at f l7. 'To demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 
114, 989 P.2d 1065 (qioting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
1991)). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at [^18 (quoting 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Then the defendant must show "that 
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting 
the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 117. 
A. The Evidence Failed To Establish a Sufficient Nexus Between Shephard and 
the Clandestine Laboratory 
In order to prove that Shephard intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation, the State must prove that he possessed a controlled substance precursor or 
laboratory equipment with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation or 
conspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. See 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-4(l). In order to prove constructive possession, there 
must be a nexus between the accused and the controlled substance precursor or 
laboratory equipment sufficient enough to permit an inference that the accused had both 
the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the materials with intent 
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. See State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 
1388 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted); State v. Reed, 2000 UT App 128 
(memorandum decision); State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, \h, 985 P2d 911; State v. 
Fox, 709 P.2d, 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
In State v. Reed, 2000 UT App 258 (memorandum decision), the defendant was 
convicted of operating a clandestine laboratory. Id. at 1. Apparently, the defendant 
lived in the house for three weeks before controlled substance precursors and laboratory 
equipment were found. Id. However, "the room containing the laboratory equipment 
was rented to someone other than the defendant." Id. Also, no controlled substance 
precursors or laboratory equipment were found among the defendant's personal effect 
and the defendant made no incriminating statements connecting him to the laboratory 
found in the house. Id. 
This Court held in Reed that in order to convict a person for operating a 
clandestine laboratory, the State must establish that the defendant intended to "engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation [and] actually possessed the controlled substance 
precursor, or laboratory equipment, or supplies." Id. And in order to prove 
constructive possession, "it is necessary that 'there [be] a sufficient nexus between the 
accused and the dmg [or paraphernalia] to permit an inference that the accused had both 
the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug [or 
paraphernalia]." Id. (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79 at ^3). 
This Court found that the fact that the defendant lived in the home for three 
weeks where the laboratory was found was "not enough to establish constructive 
possession." Id. Additionally, there was no evidence indicating that defendant had any 
control over the room or its contents where the laboratory equipment was located. Id. 
Moreover, the defendant made no incriminating statements and did not have any 
clandestine laboratory items on his person. Id. This Court concluded that this 
"evidence does not 'permit an inference that [defendant] had both the power and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control' over the contraband found in the downstairs 
bedroom." Id. (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79 at 113). 
In State v. Solas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991), police received a tip 
from an informant that the defendant would be in possession of cocaine during his lunch 
hour. Id. at 1386. The police ran a check through the State computer to determine 
whether the defendant had a valid driver's license. Id. No valid driver's license was 
found, even though the defendant had one. Id. At noon, the officers observed the 
defendant leave his place of employment with two other men and enter a vehicle 
matching the description given by the informant. Id. at 1387. The police stopped the 
defendant for driving without a license and told the defendant that they received a tip 
that the defendant would be in possession of cocaine. Id. The defendant told the 
officers that he did not "have anything to worry about," and consented to a search of 
his vehicle. Id. During a search of the vehicle, the officers discovered a package 
containing cocaine in the crack of the backseat on the driver's side of the vehicle. Id. 
When the officers discovered the cocaine, the defendant testified "they put it there." Id. 
This Court held that "[a] sufficient nexus is not established by mere ownership 
and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs were found ... especially when 
occupancy is not exclusive." Id. at 1389. (citation omitted). Additionally, this Court 
stated: 
In order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs found in an 
automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, 
there must be other evidence to buttress such an inference. The law has 
recognized several particular evidentiary factors linking or tending to link an 
accused with drugs. These include incriminating statements, suspicious or 
incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of defendant to 
location of drugs, drugs in plain view, and drugs on defendant's person. 
Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389. 
This Court, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
held that the factual evidence was inconclusive as to whether the defendant knew of or 
possessed the cocaine. Id. The Court observed that the defendant's wife was the co-
owner of the vehicle and there were two passengers in the vehicle at the time of arrest. 
Id. Further, the passengers had better access to the spot where the cocaine was found. 
Id. The Court also stated that the "defendant denied the presence of cocaine before the 
search, did not try to escape during the search ... and did not have drugs or 
paraphernalia on his person at the time of arrest." Id. Moreover, one of the backseat 
passengers sitting behind the defendant "moved around just before the stop." Id. at 
1388. The Court concluded "[tjhis furtive movement, coupled with the fact that the 
cocaine was found under the backseat where a passenger had been sitting, renders the 
remaining evidence sufficiently inconclusive as to whether defendant knew of the 
presence of the cocaine or had the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
cocaine." Id. 
In State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985), police received an anonymous 
letter stating that 7-foot marijuana plants were growing at the defendant's residence. 
Fox, 709 P.2d at 318. The residence belonged to Gary Fox. Id. After investigating the 
tip, the police determined that the yard contained "two opaque greenhouses, one of 
which was attached to the house," containing marijuana. Id. The investigating officer 
obtained a search warrant and conducted a search while the premises were unoccupied. 
Id. 
The home had two bedrooms, one apparently occupied by Clive Fox and the 
other by Gary Fox. Id. Clive's bedroom contained men's clothing, carpentry tools, and 
a plastic identification card. Id. Gary's bedroom contained men's clothing, women's 
underclothing, a checkbook and bank deposit slips with Gary's name on them, a book 
entitled Marijuana Grower's Guide, marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. Both 
greenhouses contained marijuana plants and one greenhouse was accessible from the 
kitchen and had no outside entrance. Id. Moreover, the entire house was "very humid" 
and mail addressed to both Gary and Clive was found in the house. Id. 
Although Gary owned the property and paid the gas bills, the telephone listing 
was in Clive's name. Id. And while the police did not see neither Gary nor Clive at the 
house, a neighbor testified that he thought both men lived at the house since he saw 
them both doing yard work. Id. 
Both Gary and Clive were charged and convicted of production of a controlled 
substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed Gary's conviction, finding a "sufficient nexus 
between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the 
power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." Fox, 709 P.2d at 
319. The Court observed that Gary owned the property where the marijuana was 
found, and "[h]is occupancy and control was evidenced by the presence of his personal 
effects in the same room as marijuana [and] drug-related paraphernalia." Id. at 320. 
The Court reasoned that because Gary "was the owner and occupier of the property and 
because of the manner in which the greenhouses were constructed in proximity to the 
house ... there is a reasonable inference that he not only knew of the greenhouses and 
their contents but also had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over 
the marijuana located in them." Id. 
However, the Court reversed Clive's conviction. Although the Court found that 
the evidence showed that Clive "knew that marijuana was being grown in the house .... 
The evidence [did not show] that he had power and intent to exercise dominion or 
control over the marijuana." 709 P.2d at 320. The Court observed that there was "no 
evidence that Clive Fox had any intent to grow or possess the marijuana," even though 
he "may have had knowledge of the existence of marijuana on the premises." Id. The 
Court concluded: 
The evidence showed that the telephone ... w as in Give's name, that he was 
seen there on an undated occasion doing yard work, that mail addressed to him 
was found at unspecified locations within the house, and that his expired 
identification card was found in the room that apparently was his sleeping 
quarters which contained no marijuana or related paraphernalia. On the totality 
of the evidence, a reasonable person could not find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Clive had even non-exclusive dominion or control over the area where the 
marijuana was found." 
Id. 
In Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 501, the Spanish 
Fork Police Department received information that drugs were being used at the 
defendant's and her husband's residence. Id. at \2. Police officers searched the 
residence's garbage can and found residue containing methamphetamine, cocaine, and 
marijuana. Id. That same day, the officers obtained a search warrant and searched the 
home finding "a roach clip, scissors, clippers, zig-zags (papers used to roll cigarettes), 
and 'antique' prescription pill bottles dated from 1968 to 1978." Id. Officers also 
found "hypodermic needles, hermostats, and a photograph of six men, including 
defendant's husband, in which two of the men were smoking a bong. The hypodermic 
needles were found beneath the mattress of the bed defendant shared with her 
husband." Id. All other items were found in plain view of the investigating officers. 
Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted for possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. 
at 11. 
This Court in Bryan observed that the defendant was not present when the items 
were found; there was no evidence that the defendant used or intended to use the items 
for illegal purposes; there "was no evidence that [the defendant] participated in the 
mutual use of the items seized"; and the defendant made no incriminating statements. 
Id. at 19. This Court stated, "Here, the necessary nexus between defendant and the 
items seized does not exist." Id. at if 10. This Court further stated that the conviction 
was based entirely upon inferences, and thus "the factual evidence in this case is 
inconclusive as to whether she possessed the items found in her home." Id. at f 11. 
This Court concluded that this "circumstantial evidence" was insufficient to prove 
constructive possession. Id. at \\s 10-11. 
Following the facts and conclusions of law set forth in Reed, Salas, Fox, and 
Bryan, Shephard asserts that the evidence supporting the jury's verdict in this case was 
insufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and 
intentionally possessed a controlled substance precursor or laboratory equipment 
sufficient enough to establish that he had both the power and intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the materials with intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation, thereby violating Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37d-4(l) and 58-
37d-5(l). 
A review of all the evidence allegedly linking Shephard to this charge is 
necessary to support this assertion. The police responded to a possible burglary attempt 
at Yocham's residence, and when they arrived at the scene, they saw Turner leaving the 
garage (R. 318: 248-49). Turner admitted to using methamphetamine that day and also 
was also found to have methamphetamine in his pocket when he was subsequently 
arrested, but denied any involvement with the lab discovered in the garage (R. 318: 
252, 256). 
The police then decided to conduct a "protective sweep" of the home, even 
though it was detached from the garage (R. 317: 66-67). The police knocked on the 
door several times before Shephard answered (R. 317: 67). Shephard told the police 
that he had been sleeping and that he was not the owner of the residence (R. 317: 141). 
He also told the police that he rode his bicycle there that day and he brought a couple of 
bags to the residence (R. 317: 141, 163). Shephard allowed the police to search his 
bags and no illegal items or any materials used to manufacture methamphetamine were 
found in the bags (R. 317: 141-42, 162). He also told the police that he "knew 
nothing" about the contents in the garage or what was taking place (R. 317: 165). 
Shephard admitted to using methamphetamine once or twice in his use, but denied using 
drugs currently, and apparently the police believed him (R. 317: 141, 191-93). 
The police tested the illegal items discovered in the garage for fingerprints, but 
Shephard was not linked to any of them (R. 317: 156). Shephard's fingerprints were 
found on two items inside the house, a digital scale and a beaker (R. 317: 131-33, 136-
37). 
Both Yocham and Turner testified that they were not involved with the 
clandestine laboratory, even though Yocham was the owner of the residence and Turner 
was caught leaving the garage and both admitted to being heavily involved in 
methamphetamine use (R. 318: 214, 218-19, 248-49, 252). Neither Yocham nor 
Turner claimed that Shephard was responsible for the drug lab either. Yocham did say 
that a coat found in the garage "look[ed] like" one Shephard owned and she also 
thought that a backpack found in the garage was Shephard's, however she could not be 
for sure because she had not been in the garage for two or three months (R. 318: 202, 
214). Thus, the only evidence linking Shephard to the clandestine laboratory found in 
the garage was the fact that Shephard was at Yocham's house sleeping when the police 
arrived and one fingerprint was found on a glass beaker and two prints on a digital 
scale inside the home (R. 317: 131, 132, 133, 136-37). 
Accordingly, the facts in this case are similar to Reed, Salas, Fox, and Bryan. 
This Court in Salas concluded that "when occupancy is not exclusive," a "sufficient 
nexus is not established by mere ownership and/or occupancy" without more. Id. at 
1389. There was also no evidence that Shephard had access to the garage since there 
was a functional alarm system attached to the garage (R. 317: 143). In fact, the 
evidence showed that Turner had access to the garage since he was able to enter the 
garage without setting the alarm system off, and Yocham likely had access to the 
garage since she was the owner (R. 318: 248). Shephard did have access to Yocham's 
house, since he was staying there off and on throughout 2001 and he was there on 
December 3 (R. 318: 194-95). But the fact that Shephard had access to Yocham's 
home does not establish a sufficient nexus without more. 
Like the defendants in Reed, Salas, and Bryan, Shephard did not have any drugs 
or other illegal items in his possession when he was searched (R. 317: 141-42, 162). 
And although Shephard's prints were found on a beaker and a digital scale inside 
Yocham's home, this is also not dispositive of the issue. In Bryan, police found drug 
paraphernalia throughout the defendant's house, where both she and her husband lived; 
however the defendant's conviction was reversed. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, at f2. This 
Court held that this "circumstantial evidence" was insufficient to prove constructive 
possession where the defendant made no incriminating statements and there was no 
evidence that the defendant intended to use the items for illegal purposes. Id. at *[9. 
And in Fox, where the defendant knew that marijuana was being grown to be 
distributed, there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant "had power and intent to exercise dominion or control over the marijuana." 
Fox, 709 P.2d at 320. 
Shephard also made no incriminating statements, and there was no evidence that 
he intended to engage in operating a clandestine laboratory. Just because his prints 
were found on a beaker and a digital scale inside the house, there was no evidence 
indicating when the prints were placed on those items and there was no evidence that 
those items were used in operating the meth lab. 
There was also insufficient evidence linking Shephard to the garage. Yocham 
testified only that she thought the coat found in the garage looked like Shephard's and 
she also thought that the backpack was his (R. 318: 202). Thus, Yocham could not be 
certain that the items in the garage were in fact Shephard's. Also, Yocham's testimony 
was inherently unreliable since she first testified that she was not aware that 
methamphetamine was at her residence on December 3, 2001, but was later forced to 
admit that the methamphetamine discovered that day was in fact hers (R. 318: 222, 
223-28). Moreover, Yocham received an incredibly light sentence for promising to 
testify against Shephard, even though there was substantial evidence that she was aware 
of and supported the operational clandestine laboratory in her garage (R. 318: 209-10). 
Accordingly, Shephard asserts that this evidence was insufficient to prove 
constructive possession because it does not create a sufficient nexus showing that he 
intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. There was absolutely no 
evidence that he conspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation and there was insufficient evidence to show that he possessed a controlled 
substance precursor or laboratory equipment with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation. 
B. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Submitting this Charge to the 
Jury. 
Shephard asserts that this evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that he 
intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. Although this issue was not 
preserved below, Shephard asserts that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court committed plain error in submitting this case to the jury. 
The purpose of review under a plain error standard is to "avoid injustice." 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 113 (quoting State v. Eldridge, 713 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
As shown above in point A, the State failed to prove that Shephard had both 
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over a controlled substance 
precursor or laboratory equipment with the requisite intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation. The evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it 
was plain error to submit this case to the jury. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 117. But for 
this error, Shephard would not have been convicted of this charge. 
C. Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict When the Evidence 
Was Insufficient Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Shephard's trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness for failing to move for a directed verdict. Moreover, this 
deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial. 
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for 
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a 
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); See also 
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 
S.Ct. 706, 126 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on 
failure to move to dismiss where the evidence to convict was sufficient)). 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden 
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 1|25, 1 P.3d 546; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
As stated above, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to submit this 
case to the jury. Accordingly, trial counsel's performance was deficient for failing to 
move for a directed verdict under the reasoning set forth in Reyes. But for this failure, 
this charge would not have been submitted to the jury and Shephard would not have 
been convicted of operating a clandestine laboratory. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Shephard asks this Court to reverse his conviction for 
operating a clandestine laboratory. In the alternative, Shephard asks this Court to 
remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *in day of December, 2003. 
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of these activities, when the substance is to be used 
for the illegal manufacture of specified controlled 
substances, 
(v) illegal manufacture of specified controlled sub 
stances, or 
(vi) distribution or disposal of chemicals, equip-
ment, supplies, or products used m or produced by 
the illegal manufacture of specified controlled sub-
stances 
(c) 'Controlled substance precursor" means those 
chemicals designated in Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substance Precursor Act, except those substances desig-
nated m Subsections 58 37c 3(2)(kk) and (11) 
(d) 'Disposal" means the abandonment, discharge, de-
posit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of 
any hazardous or dangerous material into or on any 
propei ty, land or water so that the material may enter the 
environment, be emitted into the air, or discharged into 
any waters, including groundwater 
(e) 'Hazardous or dangerous material" means any sub-
stance which because of its quantity, concentration, phys-
ical characteristics, or chemical characteristics may cause 
or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality, an 
increase in serious illness, or may pose a substantial 
present or potential future hazard to human health or the 
environment when improperly treated, stored, trans-
ported, disposed of, or otherwise improperly managed 
(f) "Illegal manufacture of specified controlled sub-
stances" means in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah 
Controlled Substances Act, the 
(I) compounding, synthesis, concentration, purifi-
cation, separation, extraction, or other physical or 
chemical processing for the purpose of producing 
methamphetamme, other amphetamine compounds 
as listed in Schedule I of the Utah Controlled Sub-
stances Act, phencychdine, narcotic analgesic analogs 
as listed in Schedule I of the Utah Controlled Sub-
stances Act, lysergic acid diethylamide, or mescaline, 
(n) conversion of cocaine or methamphetamme to 
their base forms, or 
(m) extraction, concentration, or synthesis of mar-
rjuana as that drug is defined in Section 58-37-2 
(2) Unless otherwise specified, the definitions in Section 
58-37-2 also apply to this chapter 2003 
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intention-
ally 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the 
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the 
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor 
chemical, laboratory equipment, or laboratory supplies 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it will be 
used for a clandestine laboratory operation, 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 
37c, Controlled Substances Precursor Act, or the regula-
tions issued under that act, knowing or having reasonable 
cause to believe that the material distributed or received 
will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation, 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandes-
tine laboratory operation, 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to 
produce or manufacture a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance except as authorized under Title 58, Chapter 37, 
Utah Controlled Substances Act, 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit sub-
58-37d-7. Seizure and forfeiture. 
Chemicals, equipment, supplies, vehicles, aircraft, vess< 
counterfeit substance or by any other person regardless of f 
whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location, or 
(h) engage m compounding, synthesis, concentration, 
purification, separation, extraction, or other physical or 
chemical processing of any substance, including a con 
trolled substance precursor, or the packaging, repackag 
ing, labeling, or relabeling of a container holding a sub 
stance that is a product of any of these activities, knowing 
or having reasonable cause to believe tha t the substance 
that is a product of any of these activities and will be used 
m the illegal manufacture of specified controlled sub 
stances 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is 
guilty of a second degree felony 2003 
58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony. 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), 
(f), or (h) is guilty of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also 
finds any one of the following conditions occurred in conjunc 
tion with that violation 
(a) possession of a firearm, 
(b) use of a booby trap, 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of 
hazardous or dangerous material or while transporting or 
causing to be transported materials in furtherance of a 
clandestine laboratory operation, there was created a 
substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to 
the environment, 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or 
did take place within 500 feet of a residence, place of 
business, church, or school, 
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced 
any amount of a specified controlled substance, or 
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for 
the production of cocaine base or methamphetamme base 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions 
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (f) of this section occurred 
in conjunction with the violation, at sentencing for the first 
degree felony 
(a) probation shall not be granted, 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be 
suspended, and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower 
category of offense 2003 
58-37d-6. Legal inference of intent — Illegal posses-
s ion of a control led substance precursor ot 
clandest ine laboratory equipment . 
The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to 
engage m a clandestine laboratory operation if the defendant 
(1) is m illegal possession of a controlled substance 
precursor, or 
(2) illegally possesses or attempts to illegally possess a 
controlled substance precursor and is in possession of aflj 
one of the following pieces of equipment 
(a) glass reaction vessel, 
(b) separatory funnel, 
(c) glass condenser, 
(d) analytical balance, or 
(e) heating mantle l9 
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and personal and real property used in furtherance - , 
clandestine laboratory operation are subject to seizure & 
forfeiture under the procedures and substantive protections 
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